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Abstract In spite of its commercial importance and signs
of clear concern in public policy arenas, trade credit has not
been subjected to systematic, extended analysis in the
business ethics literature, even where suppliers as a
stakeholder group have been considered. This paper makes
the case for serious consideration of the ethics of trade
credit and explores the issues surrounding slow payment of
debts. It discusses trade debt as a kind of promise, but—
noting that not all promises are good ones—goes on to
develop an analysis of the ethics of trade credit grounded in
an understanding of its fundamental purpose. Making a
distinction between ‘‘operating’’ trade credit and ‘‘finan-
cial’’ trade credit, the paper provides an account of the
maximum period for which it is appropriate for one com-
pany to delay payment to another from which it has pur-
chased goods or services. The concern of commentators
and policy makers that companies should not take too long
to pay their debts is affirmed, but the understanding of what
timely payment means is significantly finessed, with one
conclusion being that, if debts have not already been settled
according to acceptable standard terms of trade, cash
should pass quickly back along the supply chain once the
customer in the final product market has paid. The analysis
has implications not only for companies that take credit but
also for external parties that seek to rate companies or set
regulations according to speed of payment—an approach
that is shown to be misleadingly simplistic, albeit well
intentioned. A corresponding important responsibility for
suppliers, not to extend excessive credit (and thus act as a
quasi-bank), also follows from the analysis developed.
Having provided a novel analysis of an important business
problem, the paper then discusses some of the related
practical issues and makes suggestions for further research.
Keywords Trade credit  Creditors  Purchasing  Supply
chain  Suppliers  Promise-keeping
Introduction
In spite of its economic importance, finance has featured
relatively rarely in writing on business ethics (Boatright
2008; Hendry 2013), and with the intellectual ‘‘capture’’ of
finance by financial economics (Whitely 1986), ethics is
also given little consideration within finance literature
(Prindl and Prodhan 1994). Thus few mainstream financial
topics have been analysed adequately from an ethical
perspective. Some have barely been addressed at all; one
such topic is trade credit, in spite of late payment being
‘‘one of the most commonplace problems of business eth-
ics’’ (Sorell and Hendry 1994 p. 140). This paper seeks to
remedy that lacuna.
Trade credit is created when a supplier provides goods
or services to another firm in the expectation that payment
will be received at a date in the future. Instead of payment
in cash or near-cash, the goods or services are supplied ‘‘on
credit’’, usually with an invoice that specifies the payment
terms (e.g. payment to be received within 30 or 60 days).
This amounts to the extension of a loan by the supplying
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company to its customer. Like any loan, it entails the risk
of default or delayed payment; and it is not uncommon for
some customers to take longer to pay than indicated in the
payment terms. As will be explained below, although it is
not always recognised, the payment behaviour of the pur-
chaser (trade debtor) towards the supplier (trade creditor)
possesses ethical dimensions and should be analysed in
such terms. Although it is less intuitive, it will be argued
that the behaviour of the supplier with regard to the pro-
vision—particularly the over-provision—of trade credit
also has ethical implications.
The aims of the paper are to establish the case for
analysing trade credit in ethical terms, to highlight some
initial considerations, and to develop a framework for
thinking about it by grounding the granting of trade credit
in the underlying provision of goods and services used by a
purchasing firm in pursuit of its productive activities. The
paper is structured as follows. The first main section pro-
vides an overview of how trade credit has been discussed in
other literature (particularly finance and economics), as
well as some recent concerns that have become apparent on
the part of some policy makers and other commentators.
The second section sets out some initial thoughts about
how trade credit might be considered in ethical terms,
particularly as a promise between two firms. The third
section then develops a more fundamental, complementary
analysis regarding an ethically sound approach to trade
credit. The fourth section discusses various implications
and possible limitations of the analysis. Finally, the con-
clusion summarises the principal elements of the argument,
highlights the contributions of the paper and makes some
suggestions for further research.
An Overview of Trade Credit
The purpose of this section is to provide a non-technical
overview of trade credit: first, in order to demonstrate its
importance and thus provide a prima facie case for its
ethical consideration; and second, to provide sufficient
background for the analysis that follows.
Trade credit is a major source of external financing for
companies (Ng et al. 1999; Stern and Chew 2003; Horne
and Wachowicz 2001). Using a sample of large traded non-
financial firms of the G-7 countries, Cun˜at and Garcia-
Appendini (2012) observed that trade credit taken (ac-
counts payable) represents, on average, a sizeable
11.5–17 % of total assets. The use of trade credit by non-
financial firms has long been one of the most important
forms of financing in the US economy (Seiden 1964).
However, in the US, the amount of outstanding accounts
payable (that is, money owed by companies to other
companies) increased by four times during the period
1990–2000, reaching a total of $3,758 billion (109) (Sta-
tistical Abstract of the United States 2003, http://www.
census.gov/). In 2003, trade credit was used by 60 % of
small US businesses, (http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/
smallbus.html), rising to more than 85 % of the largest
firms (Federal Reserve Bulletin, ‘‘Financial Services used
by Small Businesses: evidence from the 2003 Survey of
Small Business Finances,’’1 A182/A183, available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov). The situation is similar in other
developed economies. In Australia, trade credit owed by
Australian businesses (both listed and unlisted corpora-
tions) is estimated to have been over $80 billion in March
2013, which accounted for around 8 % of their total lia-
bilities (Fitzpatrick and Lien 2013). Kohler et al. (2000)
estimate that 55 % of the total short-term credit received by
UK firms during the period 1983–1995 took the form of
trade credit, and it is generally accepted that more than
‘‘80 % of daily ‘business to business’ transactions are on
credit terms’’ (Wilson and Summers 2002). Trade credit is
used by both small and large companies. In 2007, trade
creditors owed small firms in the UK a total of £48,666
million (FAME2 Database). The total amount of trade
creditors for a sample of 200 FTSE firms (representing
approximately 85 % of UK stock market capitalisation) is
over £400 billion. Around 80 % of limited companies
extend trade credit to customers, which has increased 5 %
in the post-recession period; and up to 90 % of companies
receive credit from suppliers, which has increased 8 % in
the post-recession period. For many small companies trade
credit is the only source of external finance (Wilson 2014).
So, trade credit is widely and heavily used by companies
to support their business operations (Brennan et al. 1988;
Meltzer 1960; Petersen and Rajan 1997). It enables them to
receive necessary supplies in advance of receiving payment
for their own products, thus helping to support their pro-
duction processes and economic activity. However, it puts
a strain on suppliers’ own financial resources because
goods or services are produced and provided without, at
least for a time, receiving cash—and, as business wisdom
has it, ‘‘cash is king’’. Nevertheless, for better or worse,
many suppliers judge it worthwhile to grant credit in order
generate their own revenue and profits; it is a crucial aspect
of supply chains.
There are many economic studies that explain and test,
theoretically and empirically, what influences how much
1 The SSBF provides the most comprehensive information on the
patterns of credit use by small businesses and their providers for 1987,
1993, 1998 and 2003. The 2003 survey is the last to have been
conducted.
2 FAME, Bureau van Dijk database contains information for
companies in the UK and Ireland. FAME contains information on
3.4 million companies, 2.8 million of which are in a detailed format
(http://www.bvdep.com).
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trade credit is taken by companies. These studies focus on
how it can help a company to increase sales (Brennan et al.
1988; Emery 1987; Meltzer 1960; Petersen and Rajan
1997; Schwartz 1974), enabling it to gear up production in
advance of the receipt of monies owed, and hence sup-
porting growth (Cun˜at 2007; Petersen and Rajan 1997).
Studies also examine the use of trade credit as a substitute
for bank credit, particularly when the latter is difficult to
come by (Gertler and Gilchrist 1994; Jaffee 1969; Nilsen
2002; Schwartz 1974). As in previous downturns (Smith
1987; Walker 1991), the current economic recession
engendered by the banking crisis will be putting pressure
on trade credit, tempting companies to take longer to pay
their suppliers—to the detriment of these businesses (sup-
pliers) that are not always included in the list of a firm’s
stakeholders, ‘‘but deserve to be’’ (Sorell and Hendry 1994
p. 138). Part of the reason for this effect is that, in addition
to the direct impact of recession upon their operating cash
flow, firms are usually affected by difficulties in securing
funds from credit institutions during times of economic
crisis (see, for example, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. 2006;
Eichengreen and Rose 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart
1999), which encourages or tempts them to delay paying
their trade debts. In one study, only 39 % of companies in
the European countries studied paid promptly, and 3.3 %
of companies delayed payment more than 90 days beyond
the agreed due date (CRIBIS 2013).
The practice of delaying payment accords with con-
ventional commercial wisdom and is reflected in some of
the ways in which trade credit is described in finance and
corporate financial management textbooks. Trade credit
has been variously described as a ‘‘spontaneous source’’ of
funds (Block and Hirt 1994; Gitman 1988), ‘‘an easy
financing form’’ (Stern and Chew 2003; Horne and
Wachowicz 2001), ‘‘informal’’ (Arnold 2005; Gitman
1988; Weston and Copeland 1992), ‘‘accepted practice’’
(Pike and Neale 1993), and ‘‘liberal extension of money’’
(Horne and Wachowicz 2001). It is generally assumed that
the norm is for trade debtors to take a long time to pay,
particularly in industries such as manufacturing (Atrill and
McLaney 2002). Some financial texts suggest that pur-
chasing companies should aim to stretch the credit period
offered by suppliers (McMenamin 1999). Gitman et al.
(1976, pp. 169–170) confirm that a basic cash management
strategy normally applied is to pay accounts payable as late
as possible without damaging the firm’s credit rating and
supplier relationship.
Such practices raise ethical issues. Delay (or, even
worse, default, the possibility of which tends to increase
with delay) in paying by customers, especially major ones,
can have severe, if not fatal, financial consequences for
suppliers, which in turn has repercussions for their own
suppliers and other stakeholders, such as employees.
Concern has been voiced by some commentators, particu-
larly in relation to small firms (Barrow 2006; Dalton 2007;
Hodgetts and Kuratko 2001; Sihler 2004). This is probably
a worldwide concern. For example, large businesses in
China are more likely to delay payment to small businesses
(CRIBIS 2013).
Small businesses are particularly vulnerable to the
problems caused by late payment especially with
large corporate customers who can use their market
position to dictate their own payment terms. Many
large firms use their small-firm suppliers as a bank—
taking, what is in effect, an interest-free overdraft
(Ryan 2008 p. 373).
The UK is one country in which such worries have led to
several policy initiatives. For example, for a period from
19973 it was mandatory for large firms in the UK to
disclose in their Annual Reports (Directors’ Report) the
number of days taken to pay their suppliers. This was
calculated by dividing the trade creditors (accounts
payable) figure outstanding at the end of the financial year
by the aggregate amount invoiced by suppliers during the
year (not visible in the published accounts). This gave a
more reliable estimate than the ratio traditionally calcu-
lated by financial analysts, where cost of sales or even total
revenue are used as proxies for the amount invoiced by
suppliers. The figures were used for the Payment League
Table, which was developed as a ‘‘helpful tool’’ for
suppliers, in a joint venture between the Institute of Credit
Management (ICM), the Credit Management Research
Centre (CMRC) and Credit Scorer Ltd.
Further regulations were introduced in the UK in 1998.
The Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act
sought to encourage purchasers to pay on time by granting
suppliers the right to claim interest on overdue accounts.
Previously, businesses were only able to claim interest on
late paid debts if it was included in the contract, or if they
pursued the debt through the courts and the courts awarded
interest. Similarly, in 2000, Directive 2000/35/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Combating
Late Payment in Commercial Transactions was published
in the Official Journal L 200. This Directive was aimed at
dealing with the problem of late payment, with a focus on
helping small and medium enterprises (SMEs). If the cus-
tomer does not pay on the day fixed in the contract (or, if
the date or period for payment is not fixed in the contract,
within 30 days of receipt of the invoice or receipt of the
goods or services), the debtor is obliged to pay ‘‘penalty
interest’’.
Claiming and receiving such interest on the part of
suppliers tends to be challenging in practice, but these
3 SI (Statutory Instrument) 1996/189.
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legislative initiatives are symptomatic of a concern about
trade credit payment practices. More recently, in the case
of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, changes to leg-
islation tabled at European level have resulted in The Late
Payment of Commercial Debts Regulations 2013, intro-
duced on 16 March 2013. If no payment terms are agreed,
the default period is 30 days. However, payment terms
must not exceed 60 days unless both parties agree and the
extension is not grossly unfair. In the case of the public
sector, payment must be made within 30 calendar days of
receiving an invoice. Achieving such a target would be a
challenge in some countries. For example, in June 2014 the
European Commission opened a formal infringement pro-
cedure against Italy because of its failure to comply with
the Late Payments Directive, which orders governments to
reduce payment delays to no more than 60 days; and in
Spain some regions were taking about 300 days to pay for
pharmaceutical suppliers in 2011–12.
At an earlier point in time, large UK companies were
also required to disclose their policies on the payment of
trade creditors and to state whether they follow any code or
standard on payment practice, and if so, provide the name
of the code or standard and information about how to
obtain copies of the code. This disclosure requirement is no
longer required, but initiatives such as a code to deal with
trade credit still exist. So far, there have been three codes
widely available in the UK. The first, launched in
November 1991, was ‘‘The Prompt Payers’ Code’’, devel-
oped by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI).
During its period of operation between 1991 and 1997, the
Code was signed voluntarily by 1000 firms, most of them
limited companies. In 1997, the CBI Code was superseded
by the ‘‘The Better Payment Practice Code’’, developed by
the government’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
Again, this code was voluntary, and more than 1000 firms
signed it between 1997 and 2008. More recently, in
December 2008, the third UK payment code appeared,
supported by the Institute of Credit Management (ICM) on
behalf of the government’s Department for Business,
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)—the now
defunct successor to the DTI. This ‘‘Prompt Payment
Code’’ is another voluntary payment code, focused in a
direct way, not only on information and paying bills, but
also on helping to increase the speed of payments to
smaller companies. Also in 2008, the Payontime initiative
(www.payontime.co.uk) was launched to build on the work
of the Better Payment Practice Campaign, which had been
established by the UK government in 1997 in partnership
with leading business organisations. More recently the
Prompt Payment Code has been strengthened and promoted
strongly by the CBI, though a survey by the Federation of
Small Businesses in 2015 suggested that small businesses
do not place much confidence in it, with traditional excuses
for late payment (e.g. invoice lost or did not arrive) still
prevalent (see Governance and Compliance May 2015,
p. 6).
The various initiatives briefly described above are
designed to encourage ‘‘better’’ trade credit behaviour by
companies in dealing with their suppliers. The purpose of
reviewing them here is not to provide a comprehensive
account of their content and effectiveness, but rather to
establish that there are clear signs (regulations, codes,
league tables) of ‘‘worries’’ about trade credit that have
ethical overtones and would benefit from ethical analysis.
In particular, there is evidence of a desire to protect SMEs
from poor payment practice by more powerful, larger
companies.
In conclusion, this section has sought to accomplish
three things: first, to show that trade credit is an important
commercial practice; second, to show that conventional
wisdom regarding the taking of trade credit—as reflected in
financial management texts, for example—is, at best,
amoral, and perhaps immoral; and third, to note that there
have been clear signs of significant concern on the part of
policy makers and other commentators. It may also be
suggested that, if suppliers matter as a stakeholder group—
either in themselves or as the embodiment of a network of
indirect stakeholders—then trade credit matters, since it
affects their ability to survive and flourish. These factors
imply that trade credit is a practice worthy of serious eth-
ical analysis. The next section begins to develop such an
analysis.
The Ethics of Trade Credit: Initial Considerations
It might be contended that the granting of trade credit and
the payment of trade debts is simply a matter between the
two contracting parties; it is open to the supplier and pur-
chaser to agree mutually acceptable terms of trade and
equally open to them to seek legal redress in civil, rather
than criminal, law if the other party does not perform
according to the contract.4 However, it will be argued
below that there are two respects in which ethical, and not
only legal, considerations should be brought to bear: first,
because of the nature of the relationship between the two
parties; and second, because of the possible impact of their
relationship on third parties. Moreover, the authors are not
aware of any justification, in the business ethics literature,
for a general presumption that business-to-business (B2B)
4 By way of contrast, consumer credit which, in its various forms,
involves a private individual acquiring, or obtaining the use of with a
commitment or option to acquire, a consumer good is subject to
significant regulation. It is an area fraught with risks for the unwary
private individual, and governments in many nations have constructed
regulatory mechanisms to protect them.
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relationships should not, or cannot, be subject to ethical
analysis. Indeed, the practical concerns and public policy
initiatives described in the previous section are inconsistent
with such a presumption.
The policy initiatives that imply a concern over one
company taking too long to pay another company for goods
or services supplied hint at a useful distinction. First, a
company might take longer than contracted to pay its
supplier. Of course, this entails a legal breach of contract.
However, in most cases it is not worthwhile going to law
because of the expense of doing so and, where further
custom is hoped for (the norm in B2B relationships),
because of the risk of damaging future commercial activ-
ities between the two companies. Such considerations have
undermined initiatives to permit suppliers to charge interest
on overdue accounts. Nevertheless, whether or not legal
redress is considered appropriate, late payment does seem
to imply, at least, a moral philosophical opening. As
Maclagan (2012) notes, in his exposition of prima facie
duties, W.D. Ross explains that they usually involve others
who stand in some sort of relation to us, such as ‘promisee
to promiser’ or ‘creditor to debtor’ (see Dancy 1991).
Indeed, the position of being a debtor can be seen as a
particular form of promise, an undertaking to pay a sum of
money (to a creditor). As Bronaugh (1997 p. 521) com-
ments, ‘Someone who eschews promising could not make
business contracts or deal in credit’.
Prompt payment can thus be viewed as a case of keeping
a promise, the fulfilment of a ‘‘positive duty’’ from a
deontological perspective (Davis 1991 p. 216). In a culture
where late payment is the norm, it might even be viewed as
meritorious behaviour—though that would seem to devalue
the moral status of the original ‘‘speech act’’ (Austin 1962)
that is the promise. On the other hand, late payment can be
viewed as a case of breaking a promise or agreement,
which from the angle of most moral theories is considered
wrong (Sorell and Hendry 1994). The degree of moral
censure associated with such behaviour might depend on
the context. Indeed, in certain circumstances, perhaps
where there is some unforeseeable change of severe or
catastrophic proportion, late payment might even be justi-
fied or at least defensible. Such a situation might include a
sudden downturn in the economy, collapse of demand for a
particular product or the trade debtor, if it supplies busi-
nesses in turn, having difficulty collecting payments due
from a major trade customer. Sorell and Hendry (1994)
make the point, though, that this should also tend to entail
the creditor firm acknowledging its ability and willingness
to withstand the delay, rather than such delay being merely
presumed by the trade debtor and not communicated. For
example, the trade creditor might, if not out of loyalty,
make a conscious business decision that it is better to wait
longer for payment in order to help its customer and so
protect future trade with it. Such a decision might entail
actions on the part of the trade debtor, such as the provision
of appropriate information on its financial position and
prospects. The trade debtor should also not take longer to
pay than is necessary; it would be unfair to take advantage
of the generosity, or calculated benevolence, of the trade
creditor. In other words, the debtor should or can, if
appropriate, be positively released from its obligation.5
Such considerations resonate with debates on promise-
keeping more generally (Bronaugh 1997). Nevertheless,
the analysis developed in the next section serves to define a
maximum period beyond which the firm should not agree
to grant credit.
Second, however, there is a further dimension to pro-
mise-keeping to be considered. Not all promises are good
promises. What is wrong—such as a contract killer
undertaking to carry out a murder—cannot be turned into a
moral obligation by the making of a promise (Bronaugh
1997). While the promise to pay a debt would not seem to
fall foul of this problem, it might still have morally
undesirable characteristics. For example, a third party (e.g.
an existing creditor) might be adversely affected by a
reckless agreement between the two parties.6 However, the
most pertinent issue is that, where there is an asymmetry of
power involved in the setting up of the promise or bargain,
the terms might not be good for the less powerful, more
vulnerable promisee. There might be a presumption that
such circumstances are unlikely in B2B relationships; after
all, the supplier has agreed to the deal, so would be pre-
sumed to be better off with it than without it. However, that
is not to say that the deal is equally beneficial or fair to the
two parties involved.
It will be recalled that the policy initiatives referred to in
the previous section were first enacted in the context of
small companies’ relationships with larger—and hence
presumed to be more powerful—companies. It is interest-
ing to note that Hawksworth (1991 p. 219) refers to the
Social Responsibility Committee of The Boots Company
producing a booklet in which it stated that it was the policy
of the Company to ensure that ‘‘There is no abuse of
economic power in dealing with a smaller concern’’—
which implicitly recognises the potential for such abuse to
take place. In addition to delaying payment beyond the
agreed date, this might be through demanding unreasonable
terms of trade, such as an unusually long period of credit
and thus taking what is, in effect, an interest-free overdraft
(Ryan 2008). In recent times, some powerful UK retailers
have attracted significant criticism for unilaterally forcing
5 See Sorell and Hendy (1994, pp. 141–143) for more complex
considerations.
6 The protection of creditors is an important area of company law
(see Cowton 2012).
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suppliers to accept worse terms of trade, including longer
payment periods. Thus promptness is not the whole story; a
company might pay promptly but ‘‘too slowly’’. This
possibility is implied by The Late Payment of Commercial
Debts Regulations 2013 in the UK, cited earlier, which
state that payment terms must not exceed 60 days unless
both parties agree and the extension is not grossly unfair—
from which it may be inferred that there is the real practical
possibility of a ‘‘grossly unfair’’ agreement over payment
terms. Thus, beyond the issue of promise-keeping, there
arises the question of whether the agreement is fair to both
parties, with a particular initial concern—given what has
gone before—for the supplier.
One way of opening up this issue philosophically would
be to build on the tradition of a just or fair price (or some
other perspective on justice or fairness), where the number
of days’ trade credit becomes part of the consideration of
what it means for a purchaser to act fairly or justly towards
a supplier. Price is, after all, just one of the terms of trade,
albeit a very important one.
Justice can, in general terms, be viewed as being con-
cerned with whether each gets what he or she is due
(Hooker 1995). In one sense, highly relevant to this dis-
cussion, it is concerned with who gets the benefits and the
burdens (Sankowski 2005). While the application of jus-
tice, in its full sense, or manifold senses (Sankowski 2005),
to a corporation might be problematic, ‘‘commutative’’
justice—which concerns the fairness of wages, prices and
exchanges—seems to be appropriate (Solomon 1993). In
particular, when both parties are corporations, they are on a
level justice playing field.7
One practical way of judging fairness is to see how a
party treats the various other parties it deals with. One
approach would be to compare the debtor company’s
behaviour towards one supplier with its behaviour towards
other suppliers; this might expose, for example, that it pays
small suppliers more slowly than large suppliers. Such
information might be accessed via credit rating agencies
(CRIBIS 2013). If such information isn’t available, an
alternative approach would be to compare a company’s
payment behaviour with that of other firms—the kind of
comparison that payment league tables purport to perform.
However, while both forms of comparison might be of
some help in forming a judgment on a particular firm’s
behaviour, they are necessarily relative. This entails two
problems. First, it provides no objective benchmark for
what the payment behaviour should be. Perhaps a relatively
quick payer is just ‘‘the best of a bad bunch’’. Second, the
analysis developed below demonstrates that a simple
comparison of payment days has significant shortcomings
unless it is related back to the underlying supply chain
processes—on which a more satisfactory account of
appropriate payment periods can be built. Therefore,
although this section has already yielded some valuable
insights into the ethics of trade credit, the next section takes
a step back to ask more fundamental questions about trade
credit and to develop an argument that specifies what the
maximum period of trade credit should be allowed to be.
Any bargain outside this period would, we argue, be a bad
one.
The Ethics of Trade Credit: A Fundamental
Perspective
As stated at the beginning of this paper, trade credit
involves one company supplying goods or services to
another without receiving any money in return at the time
of delivery. This looks like a loan; the supplier has done
work but the money it is owed at that date will—hope-
fully—arrive later, while the business customer is enjoying
the benefit of goods and services without, at this point,
having paid for them. Financially, the purchaser is in the
same situation as if it had borrowed money from the bank
and bought the goods or services using the funds obtained;
it just owes the money to the supplier rather than the bank.
Indeed, the interchangeability of trade credit and bank
finance, as covered in texts on financial management, was
referred to earlier in this paper. However, there is an
important difference. In contrast to other forms of finance,
trade credit is provided by companies within the supply
chain that are trading with each other. Unlike equity
finance provided by shareholders or loans provided by
banks, for example, the granting of trade credit does not
add to the sum of finance within the supply chain; it is a
zero sum game, with the granting of trade credit (a non-
cash current asset) being exactly matched by a current
liability. Nevertheless, this collaborative arrangement
means that companies can undertake production before a
consequent retail sale is made, thus facilitating trade and
industry (Brennan et al. 1988; Meltzer 1960; Petersen and
Rajan 1997)—ultimately to the benefit of the supplier too,
assuming the debt is paid.
Thus suppliers can be seen as taking part in a joint
enterprise with their business customers. Suppose the
purchasing company/debtor is a supermarket that sells to
the final consumer on a cash basis. The supplier provides
goods to the retailer, whose role is to get the supplier’s
product to market. Once the final consumer pays, then a
sum of money becomes available to pay the supplier, with
the balance remaining with the retailer to pay its other costs
7 In contrast, if it is contended that corporations’ ontological status
means that they do not have rights (‘‘substantive justice’’: Hooker
1995), the assessment of fairness or justice as between an individual
and a corporation is a more complex matter.
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and generate a margin. Not only can this be seen as a joint
enterprise, but imagine if the supplier were vertically
integrated to the final consumer market—it would still have
to wait until the final consumer paid before it had the
money earned by its efforts.
This scenario demonstrates that it is reasonable for the
business customer to take trade credit while both it and its
supplier wait for a sale to be made, and cash received, in
the final product market (here, the supermarket). However,
once the cash is received, the supplier should be paid
immediately; there is no longer any justification for taking
the trade credit, and to hold the money back is to forcibly
borrow the money due to the supplier, with implications for
financial positions within the supply chain. This analysis
thus argues that the trade credit period can justifiably be as
long as, but no longer than, the period taken to receive the
money from the final consumer. At that point, the rewards
of the joint enterprise should be shared between the col-
laborators in accordance with the terms of an appropriate
agreement between them. If the supplier is not paid by that
point, the position moves from one of real or ‘‘operating’’
trade credit to one of ‘‘financial’’ trade credit.8 Moreover,
rather than there being a collaborative endeavour under
way, the continued taking of trade credit can be viewed as
exploitative; the business customer is hanging on to the
supplier’s money simply because it can. If a trade debtor
wishes to have more cash in its possession, it should go to a
bank or similar source of funding. There are several rea-
sons for this: banks have, or should have, greater expertise
in granting credit than suppliers and are better diversified;
providing finance is their raison d’eˆtre as a business, and
they are regulated accordingly; and, assuming the pur-
chasing company is not being merely opportunistic, more
working capital would be provided to the supply chain
where it is apparently needed (cf. the zero sum game
between supplier and purchaser).
We would also suggest that the position we have
described sets the limit for a just or fair bargain regarding
trade credit. Solomon (1993) comments that traditional
ethics is concerned with the nature of promises and other
obligations etc., and he notes that this fits well micro-ethics
in business—which he characterises as the rules for fair
exchange between two parties.
What is peculiar to business micro-ethics is the idea
of a fair exchange and, along with it, the notion of a
fair wage, fair treatment, what counts as a ‘‘bargain’’
and what instead is a ‘‘steal’’. Aristotle’s notion of
‘commutative’ justice is particularly at home here
(Solomon 1993).
We would suggest that for a company to delay payment to
its supplier after it has received payment for the products in
which the supplier’s goods have been incorporated is
unfair. To withhold money beyond this date is indeed—to
use Solomon’s term—a ‘‘steal’’, albeit a temporary one.
In a departure from other concerns about business cus-
tomers taking too long to pay, though, this analysis also
implies an ethical responsibility for the supplier. The point
is this: if a supplier chooses or agrees (rather than is forced)
to grant credit beyond the period when the final customer
pays, then the supplier is going beyond the parameters of
the joint productive enterprise. For any ‘‘excess’’ period of
‘‘financial’’ trade credit the supplier is, in effect, acting as a
bank rather than a commercial partner. As explained ear-
lier, suppliers are often viewed as a direct alternative to
banks. Yet, as the recent financial crisis has reminded us,
banks are special institutions, with peculiar risk charac-
teristics when compared with mainstream businesses.
Going back to at least the nineteenth century, this has led to
banks being subject to special forms of control. Insofar as
supplying firms act as banks (Ryan 2008), though, they are
not subject to such controls. We suggest that acting as a
banker without the appropriate powers or oversight is
wrong. For this reason, it is also unacceptable even for a
buying firm to compensate a supplier for expected (too)
slow payment by paying a higher price—if the payment
period extends beyond our critical period. While the
additional revenue might be welcome to a supplier, and it
might be considered fair as between the two parties, on our
account it is an inappropriate action, amounting, in part, to
the payment of interest for financial capital.
The inappropriateness of suppliers acting as providers of
financial capital is reinforced if stakeholders are consid-
ered. Given that a supplier’s stakeholders (such as
employees, its own suppliers and local community) can be
adversely affected if it has a major customer default or
delay significantly on payments, then it can be argued,
generally, that suppliers are under an obligation not to
grant trade credit inappropriately. That would include not
granting credit recklessly (e.g. to a customer that is unli-
kely to pay), but it would also include, per the analysis
here, not willingly granting credit beyond the period jus-
tified by the joint enterprise implied in getting its products
to final market. In addition to the argument made earlier
regarding asymmetry of power, this is the second respect in
which a bargain might not be a good one, even though
made willingly between two parties, since it can lead to an
increased risk of undesirable consequences for third parties
by involving the supplier in an inappropriate activity,
namely acting like a bank. If a supplier has reasons to
8 This distinction, of our own devising, mirrors the conventional
distinction in finance between operating leases and finance leases. It
also resonates with, but finesses, Ryan’s (2008) reference to taking
trade credit being like having a free overdraft.
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grant, or is forced to grant, credit for a period longer than
our analysis would support, we suggest that it should
seriously consider factoring its invoices (i.e. selling its
debts to a finance company).
This analysis thus places an ethical duty on the buying
company not to take trade credit beyond a certain period of
time but it also suggests that suppliers should endeavour to
avoid being complicit in such actions. None of this implies
that a company is under an obligation not to pay more
quickly than the deadline our analysis implies; we provide
an outer limit or constraint. Nor does our analysis rule out
some argument that firms should, in some circumstances,
for some reasons (such as established business custom),
pay more quickly than the outer limit that we have estab-
lished conceptually. However, while the analysis resonates
with policy concern about taking too long a period of
credit, it both identifies a responsibility for suppliers and
ties the understanding of an (in)appropriate trade credit
period to the underlying business process rather than
referring only to some pan-economy standard such as
60 days.
Thus we have argued that the granting and taking of
trade credit is, up to a certain point, an acceptable, or
indeed good,9 practice, but that after that point it is ethi-
cally dubious. Rather than attempting to justify some
arbitrary number of days’ credit, the argument has sought
to ground an understanding of the maximum appropriate
credit period in the underlying economic processes which
justifiably give rise to it. In the following section, we
identify and comment on some possible objections to our
analysis, including some practical issues, and then go on to
suggest what the contributions of the paper are.
Discussion
In the previous sections we have sought to establish the
importance of trade credit as an issue warranting the
attention of business ethicists. We grounded the justifica-
tion of the practice in an understanding of the joint pro-
ductive exercise that exists between buyer and seller and,
indeed, within the supply chain. Recognising that the
granting of trade credit often entails various problems and
tensions, especially where the buyer possesses considerable
power within the relationship, our initial exploration of the
issues focused on the notion of delayed payment as a kind
of broken promise, when and how a promise might be
broken or amended, and the importance of an agreement
being fair in the first place. The various public policy ini-
tiatives to which we referred earlier in the paper provide
economy-wide stipulations or recommendations of what a
generally ‘fair’ maximum payment period might look
like—60 days, for example.
However, returning to an understanding of the purpose
of trade credit grounded in the joint productive exercise
between creditor and debtor, there are circumstances in
which an arbitrarily set payment period is too long,
entailing suppliers acting as quasi-banks in supplying not
only goods and services but also ‘‘financial’’ rather than
merely ‘‘operating’’ credit. Such a situation is most likely
to occur towards the top, or consumer-facing end, of the
supply chain. This element of our analysis has particular
pertinence to suppliers’ relationship with B2C (business to
consumer) firms such as supermarkets, which have notably
high stock (inventory) turnover and tend to generate cash
within a week or two of receiving supplies, particularly in
food retailing. Yet not only do supermarkets tend to take
longer than this to pay, but there have been recent high
profile examples of supermarkets changing their policies to
move payment dates further back—even though they have
not been at imminent risk of bankruptcy and against a
background of a continuing drive to increase stock turnover
rates.
Figure 1 portrays the two elements of the maximum
payment period.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between days taken
from point of supply until cash is received into the supply
chain and the maximum period of trade credit to be
allowed. In many cases—particularly towards the bottom
end of a supply chain—we would support a standard period
that is considered reasonable and fair, as has been advo-
cated in various recent policy initiatives. This would form
the basis of terms of trade between companies, unless there
were good reasons to vary these (see earlier comments
about fair bargains and promise-keeping). However, trade
credit should be constrained to the provision of ‘‘operat-
ing’’ credit, which dominates the standard terms where the
period between supply and cash entering the supply chain
is shorter than the standard terms—hence the upward
sloping segment of the constraint line towards the left-hand
end of the x-axis.
As an attempt to open up the topic of trade credit to
ethical scrutiny, this paper has inevitably had to make some
simplifications and explore some issues to only a limited
extent. Thus, in spite of grounding the analysis in an
understanding of the trade credit phenomenon, it might be
objected that the approach is not ‘‘realistic’’. This worry
about a lack of ‘‘realism’’ might take two forms: first, that
the analysis is unduly idealistic (see below); and second,
that certain practical details have not been addressed. On
the second point, given that this paper is a first to attempt to
treat the ethics of trade credit in a systematic manner, this
is not necessarily a major flaw. Our objective has been to
9 Other things being equal, the encouragement of economic activity
is taken to be a good thing.
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make progress but also to lay the groundwork for future
discussion. Nevertheless, we will mention some practical
issues and sketch some outline responses. We will then
return to the issue of ‘‘idealism’’.
First, a supply chain can have many links. However, the
principle argued for above remains the same. Once money
enters the supply chain, it should pass quickly back along
it, assuming payment has not already been made and
received according to ‘‘standard’’ terms. If we are operating
in the sloping segment of Fig. 1, once money has entered
the supply chain, it should pass back promptly to unpaid
suppliers, without hindrance. In the era of electronic funds
transfer (EFT), this is easier to accomplish than ever
before.
Second, where supply is taking place relatively close to
the top of the supply chain, the analysis seems to imply that
prior to setting the terms of trade regarding settlement of an
invoice, the parties to the deal should forecast when cash
will be received at the end of the chain. This is usually
uncertain—though the degree of uncertainty will vary with
the particular supply chain and the point within it at which
the forecast is being made. Perhaps, though, following our
analysis, there should, in principle, be no need to set a
period of credit since, as explained, cash would simply be
received and a share passed on promptly, back through the
supply chain. It would thus appear that we are suggesting
that money received is ‘‘earmarked’’ and must be paid the
minute it is received. That might be possible in some
special situations, but, being more pragmatic, a suit-
able alternative would be to set the credit period with some
regard to the underlying business process. Thus only a
short period of credit should be granted or taken when the
transaction is temporally close to the ultimate receipt of
cash. For example, taking the case of large supermarket
groups, they would not be expected to use their buying
power to gain extended credit or even ‘‘standard’’ credit
terms, but they would be expected to be among the fastest
of payers because they sell for cash (or near-cash) and have
very high stock turnover (days rather than weeks). Again,
though, being practical, instead of the ideal of passing on
money as soon as it is received, or forecast to be received,
for particular goods, a retailer could undertake to pay based
on its average stock turnover period. Alternatively, closer
to the ideal, different products or product categories sell
more quickly than others (cf. fresh vegetables and canned
vegetables, for example), so a supermarket could base its
payment policies on the average stock turnover for par-
ticular classes of goods.
Third, the discussion about the sloping segment of
Fig. 1 has tended to assume the provision of goods for
onward sale. Similar principles would apply to raw mate-
rials or components that would be manufactured or
assembled into a new product, though they might be more
likely to be covered by the horizontal segment of the line.
There are also purchases that are used for many different
purposes (e.g. industrial fastenings in car manufacturing) or
do not enter the production or distribution process but
rather support them (e.g. stationery supplies). Similarly,
many services have a somewhat ambivalent relationship to
identifiable activities and outputs further forward along the
supply chain. However, it should still, in principle, be
possible to analyse the way in which a firm uses bought-in
services and other goods to support its activities, whether
the purchasing firm is a manufacturer, retailer or—itself—a
service provider. From an understanding of the firm’s use
of services in its own business, it should be possible to
derive suitable measures or proxies to indicate where in
Fig. 1 it is operating with a particular supplier and, in the
sloping segment, whether it is using trade credit to facili-
tate its own sales (legitimate per this analysis) or as a more
general source of finance (illegitimate).
Having addressed some of the practicalities, a more
general possible objection to the analysis is that it is unduly
‘‘idealistic’’, and hence not sufficiently ‘‘realistic’’ in what
Maximum 
appropriate 
trade credit 
period 
(days) 
“Standard” terms 
Days from supply to receipt of cash into supply chain  
Fig. 1 Maximum trade credit
period
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it expects companies to do. Companies will continue to
purchase supplies in accordance with conventional com-
mercial wisdom and financial advice, taking as much credit
as possible, up to the point where they begin to risk adverse
consequences for themselves. They will not adopt the
practice advocated here, or even change in the direction
implied by it (as illustrated in Fig. 1).
This is a familiar charge against normative business
ethics, or indeed against any ethical analysis that finds
practice wanting in some respect—though it is difficult to
imagine the value of a business ethics that was never in
tension with business practice (Campbell and Cowton
2015). In the context of business ethics, this often entails
explicit or implicit assumptions about the way competitive
markets function. In the case of trade credit, the argument
that the ‘‘realities’’ of competition leave no room for
manoeuvre, or better behaviour, might go something like
this: if a business customer does not take as much free
credit or a supplying company does not allow as long a
credit period (either in its explicit terms of business or
through enforcement of payment terms that other firms do
not attempt to do), as their respective competitors, they will
lose out economically and be forced to come into line—or
risk bankruptcy or managerial discipline by shareholders. It
should be acknowledged that it is particularly difficult for a
purchasing company to be exemplary in its payment
practices if its own customers are not treating it well;
Higginson (1993) recounts the story of ‘‘Barry’’ who is
being squeezed in the middle when he wants to pay his
suppliers promptly. There are several responses to this.
First, not all business is always as depicted above. Not
all supply chains are tactically antagonistic in all respects,
including payment terms; some are more co-operative for
strategic instrumental reasons. The notion of ‘‘centralised
supply chains’’ (Jonsson et al. 2013), in which first-order
optimisation is sought, provides a good example of a
context in which our overall analysis should be accept-
able to participants. Good payment practices should be part
of the terms of trade of partners in such a supply chain, or
indeed in any supply chain where a more collaborative
approach is being sought (Department for Business, Inno-
vation and Skills 2014).
Second, while business and competition can be tough,
some managers, at least, have some room for agency; their
behaviour is influenced by market forces (they have to be
taken into account), but it is not wholly determined by
them. As Lucas (1998 p. 59) comments: ‘‘Economic
determinism is false. The iron laws of supply and demand
are not made of iron, and indicate tendencies only.’’ How
much room for manoeuvre is available is a contingent,
empirical question. However, it is not a given that at least
some companies, some of the time, to some extent, cannot
follow our suggestions—not least, in the case of suppliers,
by debt factoring or invoice discounting (i.e. selling to a
third party, at a discount) some of their invoices, rather
than continuing to extend ‘‘financial’’ credit themselves, if
that is where the problem lies.
Third, even if companies are propelled by market forces
(such as the power of a major customer) into providing
unreasonable terms or even financial trade credit, but
cannot engage in factoring for some reason, our analysis
identifies the shortcomings of such practice and invites
regulatory or other system-level reform to address the
issue.
Finally, not all organisations that incur trade debts are
profit-seeking businesses: just as The Late Payment of
Commercial Debts Regulations 2013 imply a higher stan-
dard for public sector organisations, so those—and simi-
lar—organisations might have greater potential for
following the guidance implied by our analysis. It is
important to remember that not all organisations are subject
to the disciplines of the market. However, as noted earlier,
this would involve some governmental or public sector
organisations, especially in some countries, drastically
changing their payment practices, which is less likely to
happen during a period of austerity in public budgets.
Furthermore, again contra the charge of ‘‘idealism’’,
there are implications of our analysis beyond the behaviour
of the creditor and debtor companies themselves. One is that
companies’ payment practice should not be judged solely
according to the number of days’ credit they take on aver-
age. The analysis of this paper demonstrates that a com-
monsense focus on days’ credit, which is how published
‘‘league tables’’ of payment practice are constructed, is
misleading. It is almost certainly more meritorious for a
manufacturer to pay in 30 days than for a supermarket to
pay in 25 days, for example. Compilers of such tables might
complain that they are the best that can be produced, given
the data available, but if the best ranking that can be pro-
duced is misleading, it might be better not to produce it at
all. Moreover, following from the argument of this paper,
various improvements might be considered. For example,
separate tables might be compiled for different types of
companies, with the grouping designed to reflect different
underlying characteristics regarding the movement of goods
through the supply chain towards final product markets and
the receipt of cash therein. In particular, it would be desir-
able to separate out companies that are likely to be oper-
ating in the sloping segment of Fig. 1. A similar point might
be made about codes of practice or regulations such as those
referred to earlier; at the very least, our analysis highlights
the issue that, when they focus on the number of days’
credit, they are simplifying in a way that does not do justice
to different commercial contexts.
Finally, although this paper is normative, in the sense of
setting out an ideal and providing recommendations, it does
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not base its arguments primarily on the ‘‘uneasy application
of some very general ethical principles’’, which tends to be
problematic for business ethics (Solomon 1993, p. 354,
emphasis added). Rather, it grounds the analysis in an
account of what trade credit is (the Initial Considerations
section) and what it is for (the Fundamental Perspective
section). This is one sense in which it is a relatively ‘‘re-
alistic’’ analysis.
Conclusion
Trade credit is an important commercial practice, the sig-
nificance of which has been highlighted again by the recent
credit crisis. Yet, even though late payment is one of the
most commonplace problems of business ethics in practice
(Sorell and Hendry 1994), trade credit has not featured as
an element of the business ethics research agenda (Cowton
2008). This paper is, we believe, the first in a business
ethics journal to identify and explore the ethics of trade
credit—a perspective that is notably absent from the
finance literature. We have outlined some of the concerns
that have been voiced in business and public policy circles
regarding trade credit practices, particularly that payment
is too slow—with a particular concern for large, more
powerful companies’ treatment of SMEs.
However, our analysis has highlighted two particular
shortcomings of an exclusive focus on speed of payment
when evaluating the behaviour of business customers in
paying for their supplies. First, it is important to distinguish
between speed of payment and promptness. Promptness is
a good thing in the sense that it fulfils a promise, but justice
is served only if the underlying bargain is fair. This might
be related to a general consensus about what is fair in a
particular economy or, perhaps, industry. However, in
some situations, closer to the top of the supply chain, a
judgement on fairness should be related back to the
underlying productive processes involved, to ensure that
the business customer does not take advantage of trade
credit beyond the point at which it receives cash for the
relevant sale. From this, it is clear that speed (slowness) of
payment, as measured by number of days’ credit taken, can
be a misleading indicator of the commendableness of a
firm’s behaviour.
A further novel aspect of our analysis is to go beyond a
focus on the buying firm to introduce into the picture the
responsibilities of the firm supplying the goods or services
on credit. These are not so much the conventional
responsibilities of a bank not to lend irresponsibly (Cowton
2002, 2010)—though reckless granting of trade credit is
not to be recommended or even condoned, because of the
damage such behaviour can do to the interests of share-
holders and other stakeholders. Rather, we have argued that
the responsibility of the supplying firm is to endeavour not
to act as a bank at all—which is what effectively happens
when a purchasing firm takes credit for longer than the
maximum legitimate period in the slope segment of Fig. 1.
To repeat our distinction, it is legitimate to provide ‘‘op-
erating’’ trade credit but not ‘‘financial’’ trade credit.
Given that this paper is positioned as an initial sustained
contribution to the ethics of trade credit, it has not been
possible to consider all the relevant issues in depth, and the
topic would repay further research. Further conceptual
argument might challenge or extend our arguments, thus
refining our discussion. For example, might a supplier ever
be considered to have a positive duty to provide trade
credit? When might it be acceptable for a trade debtor to
delay payment, on what grounds and with what corre-
sponding responsibilities? What are the ethical issues
relating to debt factoring and invoice discounting? What
further insights might the literatures on justice and fairness
or on promise-keeping furnish? What information should
companies be required to disclose about their payment
practices? How might all this work through in different
supply chain contexts? In addition to conceptual work, case
studies of particular firms and supply chains would be
helpful too. More systematic empirical research in this
under-researched area is also needed. Possible projects
might include determining whether some firms (e.g. gen-
erally more ‘‘responsible’’ ones) are more likely to pay on
(good) time and investigating whether policy initiatives or
tools (e.g. codes of payment practice) are effective in
encouraging good payment behaviour.
Finally, although we have positioned this paper as a
novel contribution to finance ethics, it has relevance to
other aspects of business ethics too. In particular, trade
credit should be factored into ethical analyses of, and
debates about, supply chain ethics and responsibilities to
suppliers and their stakeholders. It should also be consid-
ered as part of the terms of trade alongside the issue of fair
or just prices where the transaction is between businesses
rather than, according to the traditional focus, between
businesses and consumers.
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